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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents the findings of a survey of taxi licensing 
policy in England and Wales in mid 1989. The survey acts partly 
as a follow-up study to earlier work reported earlier in this 
series (Toner 1989 WP 273) and partly as a vehicle for the 
assessment of a number of additional issues. These issues form 
the key to an understanding of the consequences to both consumers 
of taxi services and road users more generally of the decision 
to either retain or remove restrictions on entry to the hackney 
carriage trade. 
The results presented are purely corss-sectional in nature and 
do not include a treatment of the important issues of price and 
service effects. These topics will form the basis of further 
papers (see, for example Pells, (1990) WP 290 for initial 
findings on values of waiting time and price elasticities in the 
hackney market). 
TAXI LICENSING FOLLOW-UP STUDY: SUMMARY OF MAIN RESULTS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This working paper forms part 2 of a series of two documents 
reporting the results of surveys of hackney carriage licensing 
officers in local authorities throughout England and Wales. The 
first paper (Toner 1989) assesses the state of the taxi market 
(both hackneys and private hire cars (PHCs)) before the 
implementation of the 1985 Transport Act by drawing on work 
carried out by TRRL (Coe and Jackson (1981), Coe (1986)). Toner 
then compares the state of the industry in 1985 with that in 
early 1989. 
The survey reported here serves both as a follow up to Toner's 
work, and as a vehicle for the examination of a number of 
additional key features of local taxi market regulation and 
operation. The paper is in 11 sections. Section 2 discusses 
sample issues, sections 3 to 6 discuss licensing and fares 
policy, section 6 examines the degree of quality enforcement 
undertaken by local authorities. Sections 7 to 10 discuss peak 
demand generators,rank provision, trade structure and "Section 
16" cases respectively. Finallt, the results are summarised in 
section 11. Throughout the paper results are broken down 
according to hackney licensing policy and district type 
(metropolitan or non-metropolitan). The results are summarised 
and discussed in relation to the effects of the 1985 Transport 
Act in Pells and Toner (1990). 
1.1 Backqround to the 1985 Act 
Sections 10-17 of the 1985 Transport Act concern taxis and PHCs 
and has 3 main areas of impact, the extension of licensing 
throughout England and Wales, the partial removal of entry 
barriers to the hackney trade, and the stimulation of innovatory 
practices such as shared hackneys and taxi (hackney) - buses. It 
is with the second area of impact in particular, and the 
regulator's role in providing the general legislative and 
physical environment to the operation of the taxi markets that 
this paper is primarily concerned. 
1.1.1 Entry restriction to the hacknev trade and Section 16 of 
the 1985 Trans~ort Act 
It is the section of the Act which deals with entry control which 
has proved the most important and the most controversial. Whereas 
under the provisions of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 a 
district council was able to set the number of licensed vehicles 
at whatever level it considered desirable, (in practice- this 
meant the imposition of a restriction on the supply of taxis in 
many cases), under the new legislation this right would be 
weakened. The original intention of the Government was to remove 
the ability of councils to restrict the quantity of taxis 
completely, but a late amendment prevented this from occurring. 
Thus, since January 6th 1986 Local authorites have retainedthe 
right to restrict entry to the market if, but only if, they can 
demonstrate on the basis of firm independent evidence that there 
exists no Ilsignifi~ant~~ demand for taxi services in the area of 
jurisdiction which is munmetll (Section 16) . Further, an 
individual who is refused a licence is given the right to appeal 
against the decision. In practice therefore, in a number of cases 
it has been possible for applicants for licences, either acting 
individually or in groups, and using the powers of the court, 
to successfully overturn a council~s decision not to grant a 
licence (or licences). In contrast a council wishing to remove 
controls is not required to provide any evidence on demand. 
The practical difficulties in defining the terms significant and 
unmet in this context have come to light in many of the 31 
studies that ITS has carried out for district councils to 
facilitate compliance with section 16. Let us first consider the 
word I1unmet1l; it has become clear that this has wider application 
than simply representing those potential passengers who seek a 
taxi and are unsuccessful. The now accepted measure for 
identifying unmet demand is the waitingtimes ofthose passengers 
actually served. Thus unmet demand has come to be interpreted as 
failure to dispatch a taxi immediately (or at the pre-arranged 
time where appropriate) if the taxi is requested by phone, or 
the absence of a waiting taxi at a rank when a passenger arrives. 
This rather stringent (although relatively clear) requirement 
of prompt supply is blurred however when we attempt to determine 
at which level unmet demand becomes llsignificantll. This is 
especially the case when we consider the general pattern of 
demand for taxi services both throughout the day and at different 
times of the week. In many provincial settings taxis provide the 
onlymeans of travelling between certain origins and destinations 
or the only means of travel available at certain times of day. 
A prime example of this is demand for taxis late at night. In the 
UK most entertainment facilities close at about the same time in 
the evening (about 2300), and similarly night clubs most often 
close betwen 0100 and 0200. Demand for taxis at these times, at 
weekends especially, is very much higher than that during all 
other periods. As a consequence waiting during such periods can 
often be high, especially at ranks. 
1.1.2 A discussion of the possible conseauences of removing 
entrv controls. 
To supply sufficient taxis to meet peak demand more fully where 
this exists, or to increase supply through the lifting of entry 
restrictions althogether could have a number of side effects; 
these effects and their causes are now discussed. First such 
policies might produce a reduction in drivers1 earnings. Assuming 
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an elasticity with respect to cab numbers of below unity; an 
increase in cab supply will produce a less than proportionate 
increase in demand. This will increase the amount of time each 
cab is vacant and therefore reduce earnings. If the former level 
of earnings is to be re-established two alternatives exist, 
either fares must increase or expenditure on vehicle maintenance 
or renewal must fall. In 90% of districts fares are determined 
by local authorities (Toner 1989) and since fares reviews are 
typically only carried out on an annual or biannual basis, it 
is likely to be the latter cause of action which is taken in the 
short run. This may lead to a poor standard of up-keep of 
vehicles and threaten comfort and safety standards. Further, 
after a time lag these quality and safety reductions, if they 
occur, may then be followed by fares increases. This is 
especially likely if, as is often the case, the evidence used 
by councils to decide the magnitude of fares increases comes 
either directly or indirectly from the trade. In the absence 
of any change in quality enforcement policy on the part of the 
regulator, there is no mechanism to guarantee that quality and 
safety levels will be re-established at their former higher 
levels. 
Even in those districts where fares are not regulated there may 
be a tendency for fares to rise if entry to the market occurs. 
It has been suggested that where a cruising market exists (with 
cabs being hired as the result of being flagged down in the 
street), passengers will be inclined to take the first cab to 
arrive. This is because there is no guarantee that the next cab 
to pass will be cheaper, or if it is cheaper, sufficiently so to 
compensate for the increased waiting time involved in obtaining 
it. Hence there is no advantage to operators in price competition 
(Douglas 1972, Schreiber 1975). 
Cruising is not the dominant form of operation however, except 
perhaps in London, and it has been argued that with large scale 
firms, for example operating on a radio circuit Associations, it 
would be possible to advertise low fares in a manner which would 
attract custom and make the operation of competitive fares 
possible (Coffman 1977). Further, Williams (1980) has argued that 
where there is a trade substantially made up of rank work the 
same could apply as long as cabs displayed fare levels and the 
passenger was free to choose freely between them. This latter 
condition does not apply at present since a first-in-first-out 
system operates at ranks throughout the country. The layout of 
many existing ranks is such that it is only possible for cabs to 
file in and out according to a strict queueing disciplin. 
Empirical evidence on this matter is rather sparse at present, 
but a study carried out in the USA (Teal and Bergland 1987) and 
another in Chile (Fernande and de Cea 1985) although by no means 
conclusive do not provide support to the idea that market fares 
determination in a free entry situation leads to any downward 
pressure on prices. If anything, these studies show that prices 
tend to rise. This remains a contensious issue; whereas in theory 
it is not difficult to envisage circumstances where price 
competition might occur, many practical difficulties in realising 
< - 
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that competition are apparent. - .  
The reduction in earnings caused by increased supply may in some 
circumstances be a desirable result. In many instances where 
local authorities have controlled both fares and quantity, the 
effect has been to create quasi-rents, or premium values, 
attached to the possession of a licence. Clearly where such a 
premium exists there also exists the potential of transferring 
the benefits to passengers through lower fares and/or increased 
supply 
A further side effect of the relaxation of quantity control 
relates to traffic problems. For obvious reasons taxi ranks are 
often situated in central areas where road space is in short 
supply. This makes it difficult to extend ranks for either 
physical or policy reasons. In such cases, an increase in vehicle 
numbers can create or exacerbate problems of rank over-spill 
causing obstruction to other traffic. In some areas, by simply 
increasing the number of vehicles in circulation in the town 
centre, a quantifiable effect on the level of congestion can 
result, especially in historic towns where the topography may 
impose severe constraints on traffic. 
2. The survev sam~le 
Of the 367 questionnaires distributed in March 1989, 276 replies 
were obtained between mid March and early July, a response rate 
of 73.4%. However, the earlier survey received a higher response 
of 86% and some councils who responded to the follow-up survey 
did not respond to the first. For these reasons it is necessary 
at the outset to devote some attention to the make-up of the 
present survey sample in order that comparisons between the two 
samples be put in context. 
Of the 47 councils who did not respond to the first survey, 29 
(62%) responded this time. The contents of this questionnaire 
comprised questions from both surveys. Thus we now have 
information from 349 councils or 93%. Conversely, of those who 
responded to the first survey some 73 failed to respond to the 
second. Information from 247 (just under two thirds of all 
councils) is therefore directly comparable. In the text which 
follows the different data sets will be classified as follows:- 
Table 1. The survey samples. 
Data 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
Description 
All respondents to 1988 survey 
All respondents to 1989 survey 
In B but not in A 
In A and B 
A + C  
Sample size 
320 
276 
2 9 
247 
349 
The data set used in each part of the analysis will. be 
identified. 
3. HACKNEY LICENSING POLICY 
In this section we present an update of hackney licensing policy. 
The situation throughout England and Wales regarding entry 
regulation in summer 1989 is summarised in figure 1 (data set D). 
Of the 231 councils responding to the question, nearly two thirds 
were regulating entry. We now consider any changes in entry 
policy over the period between the two surveys. 
When we examine those districts for whom we have two sets of 
data we find that the situation is very much as it was in early 
1988 with 2 deregulating, 2 proposing to deregulate, and 1 
reimposing restrictions. We are also aware of one non responding 
district which has reimposed quantity restrictions during 1989. 
In addition, 5 districts had (or were proposing to) attach 
conditions concerning the ability to take wheelchairs as -a 
condition of being granted a licence. Thus, as was found in the 
1988 survey, for every one authority which has deregulated as a 
result of the 1985 Act about three are continuing to control 
entry. 
FIGURE l. HACKNEY UCENSING POUCY 
FREQUENCY OF POLICY 
Officers were asked if they had issued any new hackney plates 
in the period since the previous survey; responses were as 
follows: - 
Table 2. The issue of hackney licences. 
Data set D 
Outcome 
of policy 
Issued 
Not issued 
Total 
Of the 246 councils responding to both surveys, two thirds had 
issued some plates. Further, of the 133 regulated districts, 
nearly half had issued plates in the twelve month period of 
interest and over 10% of those who had deregulated since the 
Act had issued none. 
Officers in Authorities which had issued licences were asked to 
indicate the number issued over that period. The responses are 
given in table 3. 
Dereg -86 Dereg -86 Regulated Total 
Table 3 Hackney licences issued. 
F % 
164 66.7 
82 33.3 
246 100.0 
F % 
38 88.4 
5 11.6 
43 100.0 
Data set B. 
The average number of plates issued by licensing policy is given 
in table 4. Taking all districts with entry restrictions we see 
that on average 6 licences have been issued in the period of 
interest. Taking all authorities who have deregulated since 1986 
together, the increase in cab numbers over the period in question 
has been over three times greater than in those who deregulated 
prior to the implementation of Section 16. 
F % 
28 96.5 
1 3.5 
29 100.0 
Plates 
issued 
1-10 
11-20 
21-30 
31-40 
41-50 
50-100 
101-200 
200+ 
Total 
F % 
61 45.9 
72 54.1 
133 100.0 
Frequency 
8 4 
2 9 
14 
6 
8 
9 
3 
2 
155 
Per cent 
54.2 
18.7 
9.0 
3.9 
5.2 
5.8 
1.9 
1.3 
100.0 
Cumulative 
Per cent 
54.2 
72.9 
81.9 
85.8 
91.0 
96.8 
98.7 
100.0 
100.0 
Table 4. Mean issuance of hackney licences. 
*Total exceeds sum of rows due to missing values. 
Data set D. Numbers in parentheses are adjusted for outliers. 
The distribution of licence issuance by policy type is 
illustrated in figure 2. As can be seem post-section 16 de- 
regulated Authorities are subject to outliers thus affecting the 
mean issuance figure given in table 5. Removing the 4 
authorities who have issued in excess of 90 plates, (Arun 255, 
Great Yarmouth 145, Newcastle Upon Tyne 140 and Newport 97), 
reduces the average issuance to 20.7 plates and the value for 
issuers only to 29.0. 
FIGURE 2. HACKNEY UCENCE ISSUE BY 
UCENSING POUCY W E  
FREQUENCY 
i io,  
ISSUE MIDPOINT 
POLICY m 1 m 2 m 3 
.<. - 
KEY TO POLICY: /=DEREGUL.ATED 1906 
Z=DEREGULATED PRE /906.3=RECULATED 
- .  
The number of applications for hackney plates refused was as 
follows : - 
Table 5. Hackney licence applications refused. 
Data set B 
Applications 
refused 
0 
1-5 
6-10 
11-20 
21-100 
101-200 
201-400 
Total 
Only 31 districts claimed to have refused licence applications. 
Officers were asked if there existed a waiting list for hackney 
plates: of the 247 districts, 84 (34.0%) had a waiting list. The 
length of the waiting list for hackney plates is summarised in 
the following table. 
Freq 
5 0 
15 
5 
3 
5 
1 
2 
8 1 
Table 6 Waiting lists for hackney plates. 
Per cent 
61.7 
18.5 
6.2 
3.7 
6.1 
1.2 
2.4 
100.0 
Data set B 
Waiting list 
1-20 
21-40 
41-60 
61-80 
81-100 
101-140 
141-180 
181-220 
221-280 
281+ 
Total 
Taking the information on requests for licences refused and the 
incidence of a waiting list for plates together provides a more 
comprehensive idea of the effective restriction on licence 
issuance (table 7). 
Frequency 
21 
2 0 
12 
11 
5 
5 
6 
2 
1 
1 
8 4 
Per cent 
25.0 
23.8 
14.3 
13.1 
6.0 
6.0 
7.1 
2.3 
1.2 
1.2 
100.0 
Table 7 Incidence of refusal to issue plate to applicant(s) 
(number of Authorities). 
Data set B 
Effective 
restriction 
Refused 
not refused 
Total 
Of the 276 responding Authorities 43 or 16% had refused at least 
one application for a hackney plate. 
Having established the extent of entry restriction we now go on 
to consider the consequences of such a policy: first we look at 
the premium value attached to a hackney plate. Officers in 
districts with entry control were asked to estimate the premium 
attached to a hackney licence plate: the distribution of premium 
values was as follows; 
Dereg -86 Dereg 86- Regulated Total 
Table 8 Licence premia. 
F % 
2 4.2 
46 95.8 
48 100.0 
* The 11 districts included as zeros maintained that the trading 
of 1-icences either didn't apply in their case or that trading was 
not permitted. Data set B 
Premium ( C  S) 
0 * 
101-1000 
1001-5000 
5001-10000 
10001-15000 
15001-20000 
20001-25000 
25001-30000 
Total 
The mean plate value is estimated to be £8,800. Taking the 69 
districts respondingto the both surveys with a non-zero premium 
we find an average plate value of £9.930. This compares with an 
average value of £8,060 (or £8,700 at March 1989 prices), 
reported by the same councils in 1988. Premium values have 
therefore risen in real terms by 14%. Users of hackney services 
in areas where quantity restrictions have remained, taken 
collectively, do not therefore appear to have benefitted since 
the implementation of the Act. This is an interesting result 
.- 
- 
9 
F % 
43 15.6 
233 84.4 
276 100.0 
F % 
0 0.0 
34 100.0 
34 100.0 
F % 
41 45.9 
108 54.1 
149 100.0 
Frequency 
11 
6 
26 
31 
16 
8 
3 
2 
103 
Per 
cent 
10.7 
5.8 
25.2 
30.1 
15.5 
7.8 
2.9 
1.9 
100.0 
Cumulative 
per cent 
10.7 
16.5 
41.7 
71.8 
87.3 
95.1 
98.0 
99.9 
100.0 
which tends to imply that any losses of market power caused by 
controlled increases in cab numbers are being more than 
compensated for by increases in real fares and/or cuts in 
expenditure on vehicles. 
Table 9 illustrates the sharp contrast in estimated premiums 
between metropolitan and non metropolitan districts, the former 
being only two thirds of the latter. 
Table 9. Licence premia by district status (E's) 
Data set D: 1989 prices. 
Premium value 
4. HACKNEY FARES POLICY 
Using information from both surveys it was possible to determine 
the incidence of fares increases over the period between the 
surveys for 250 districts; the findings by policy type are given 
in table 10. 
All 
8,400 
Table 10 Incidence of fares increases by licensing policy type. 
Mets 
11,900 
Data set D 
Non Mets 
8,000 
increase 
over period? 
Yes 
No 
Total 
In the 1988 survey officers were asked what evidence they took 
into consideration when assessing the need for a fares increase; 
they were also asked if they revised fares on a regular basis, 
and is so at what intervals (see Toner 1989 p9).  Of particular 
interest with regard to the issue of regulatory capture is the 
proportion of districts responding to demands from the trade for 
fares increases and whether this can be related to licensing 
policy accross the country. Using this information along with 
that on licensing policy in the present survey provides 177 
observations summarised in table 11. 
Dereg -86 
F % 
12 31.6 
26 68.4 
38 100.0 
Dereg 86- 
F % 
8 28.6 
20 71.6 
28 100.0 
Regulated 
F % 
44 32.6 
91 67.4 
135 100.0 
Total 
F % 
70 31.1 
155 68.9 
225 100.0 
Table 11 Proportion of Districts using Trade information in 
fares determination policy by licensing policy type. 
Incorporate 
Trade opinion? 
Yes 
The trade opinion appears to be relied upon to the greatest 
extent by those authorities where entry controls have been 
relaxed as a result of the Act. Only about one in four currently 
regulated authorities rely to any extent on the trade for advice 
on pricing policy. 
Total 
One further indicator of interest is the incidence of regular 
fares revisions and the time between these (table 12). 
Dereg -86 
F % 
6 37.5 
Although the sample sizes here are small, there does appear to 
be some evidence that fares revisions occurr much less often in 
those districts which have been traditionally deregulated. 
However, the similarity between the proportions for the other 
two categories suggests that this is possibly due to the nature 
of these districts and that those which have deregulated since 
1985 have made no change to their fares setting procedures. 
Data sets A and D 
16 100.0 
Table 12 Time interval between fares revisions by licensing 
policy type. 
Dereg 86- 
F % 
7 58.3 
12 100.0 
Data sets A and D 
Regulated 
F % 
22 23.2 
Reviewed at 
least biannually? 
Yes 
No 
Total 
5. THE LICENSING OF PRIVATE HIRE CARS. 
Total 
F % 
64 26.2 
95 100.0 
PHCs carry out many of the same functions as hackney carriages; 
a factor which has led to much confusion among the public, though 
are are not permitted to ply for hire in the street. The main 
piece of legislation governing PHC licensing is the 1976 Local 
Government Miscellaneous Provisions Act. The Act lays down the 
basis of powers to regulate vehicle type, driver, and safety 
- 
11 
244 100.0 
Dereg -86 
F % 
4 13.3 
26 86.7 
30 100.0 
Dereg 86- 
F % 
8 44.4 
10 55.6 
18 100.0 
Reg , d 
F % 
42 44.2 
53 55.8128 
95 100.0 
Total 
F % 
43 25.1 
74.9 
171 100.0 
standards but does not permit the control of entry. The Act.is 
permissive in nature but does not require that licensing of PHCs 
be carried out. Officers in districts where licensing does take 
place were asked if they had issued any PHC licences in the 
period of interest; the responses were as follows:- 
Table 13 Incidence of PHC licence issuance. 
Data set B 
Those districts which do licence PHCs were asked to provide 
details of the number of licences which had been issued; the 
distribution of responses is illustrated in figure 3 (data set 
Per cent 
82.1 
5.8 
12.1 
100.0 
Issued 
licences? 
Yes 
NO 
No licencing 
Total 
FIGURE 3. PHC UCENCE ISSUE BY 
HACKNEY UCENSING POUCY TYPE 
Frequency 
197 
14 
2 9 
240 
FREQUENCY 
- - 
0 2 0  40 6 0  80  100 200 300 400  5 0 0  
PHCS MIDPOINT 
POLICY m i m 2 m 3 
KEY TO POLICY; I =DERECULA TED POST 1986  
Z=DERECULATED PRE 1986,3=RECULATED 
The number of PHC licences issued by hackney licencing policy 
is as follows:- 
Table 14 Mean issuance of PHC licences. 
Data set B 
Policy Viz 
Hackneys 
Dereg before 86 
Dereg since 86 
Regulated 
Total 
The previous study (Toner (1989), Waterman and Toner (1989)), 
identified an apparent trend whereby the effect of removing entry 
controls was to change the balance between hackney and PHC 
numbers without having any substantial effect on total market 
size. Fairhead et al. (1989) found that over a longer period the 
hire car market had expanded such that the overall market for 
taxis and PHCs had increased. The findings from the 1989 survey 
would tend to support this finding suggesting that the effect 
identified by Toner was merely an initial effect of the freeing 
of local markets. Nevertheless, as can be seen from table 5, 
growth in PHC numbers has been far from uniform with mean growth 
in post section 16 deregulated districts being only 80% of that 
in pre section 16 deregulated districts, and 40% of that in 
regulated districts. In fact, if we take the ratio of the 
increase in hackneys to the increase in PHCs across districts for 
the period 1988 to 1989 (including zero entries) we obtain a 
value of 1.8 for pre section 16 deregulated districts and 3.1 for 
post section 16 deregulated districts. This suggests much faster 
growth in taxi numbers relative to PHC numbers in the latter 
category of districts compared with the former. 
Mean issuance 
23.35 
18.86 
49.70 
38.45 
Table 15 Mean issuance of PHC licences. 
Data sets B and D 
Policy on 
Hackneys 
Dereg before 86 
Dereg since 86 
Regulated 
Total 
Those districts who do not licence PHCs were asked to estimate 
the number of hire cars operating in the area; the responses 
were as follows:- 
- 
13 
Mean issuance 
of PHC licences 
23.4 
18.9 
49.7 
38.5 
Ratio of hackney 
inc. to PHC inc. 
1.8 
3.1 
0.4 
1.1 
Table 16. PHCs operating in unlicenced districts. 
Data set B 
Officers were asked if their authority had adoptedthe provisions 
of the 1976 Miscellaneous Provisions Act in the last year or so. 
Eight authorities had done so in 1988, 6 in 1989, and 1 planned 
to in 1990. 
Per cent 
6.7 
46.7 
26.7 
13.3 
6.7 
100.0 
PHCs 
1-10 
11-50 
51-100 
101-200 
201-400 
Total 
6. QUALITY ENFORCEMENT POLICY. 
Frequency 
1 
7 
4 
2 
1 
15 
Under the provisions of the 1976 Local Government Miscellaneous 
Provisions Act local authorities have wide powers to attach 
conditions to the ownership of a hackney carriage or PHC licence. 
Officers were asked whether they imposed a range of conditions 
on vehicles licensed as hackneys and PHCs in their area. The 
responses were as follows:- 
Table 17. Vehicle standards enforced. 
Data set B 
Variable enforced 
Vehicle type 
Engine size 
Space inside 
Vehicle age 
Livery 
Sample size 
The most enforced aspect of vehicle for both PHCs and hackneys 
is the amount of space provided for passengers in the vehicle. 
Second for hackneys is vehicle type but for PHCs second place 
goes to engine size. Livery is the least enforced variable for 
both type of service. Maximum vehicle ages may be specified but 
cannot be rigidly enforced. foe example, if a driver presents a 
car which is older than the limit but which is judged to be of 
adequate condition, the authority is obligedto pass it. Maximum 
desirable vehicle age is specified by about 40% of authorities 
and seems to be applied equally to PHCs and hackneys. 
< - 
14 
Hackneys 
Per cent 
45.6 
37.3 
57.0 
41.9 
29.9 
271 
PHCs 
Per cent 
39.5 
41.3 
61.0 
40.4 
18.6 
243 
The level of quality enforcement by hackney licensing policy'was 
as follows: the table gives the per cent of councils in each 
category who enforce each respective variable. 
Table 18. Enforcement by licensing policy. 
Data set D 
Variable 
Vehicle Type 
Engine size 
Space inside 
Vehicle age 
Livery 
A potentially important pattern is identified here with vehicle 
age, perhaps the most useful measure of vehicle quality, being 
enforced by only just over a third of newly deregulated 
authorities. This proportion is markedly lower than forthe other 
two categories of authority. Further, internal dimensions of 
vehicles are regulated to a greater extent in the regulated 
districts. Otherwise, there do not appear to be any strong 
differences between the categories. 
Analysis of hackney enforcement policy by district status 
highlights some interesting differences. Metropolitan districts 
appear to enforce vehicle type and livery to a much greater 
extent than non-metropolitan districts who seem to concentrate 
more heavily on features such as engine size and vehicle age when 
setting standards. 
Dereg -86 
51.1 
42.2 
51.1 
37.8 
33.3 
Table 19. Enforcement by district status. 
Dereg 86- 
40.0 
37.1 
54.3 
45.7 
25.7 
Data set B 
Regd 
50.3 
34.5 
63.9 
46.9 
34.0 
Variable enforced 
Vehicle type 
Engine size 
Space inside 
Vehicle age 
Livery 
Sample size 
We were also interested to find out how much time was devoted 
to quality enforcement issues. Officers were asked to provide 
details of the type and frequency of vehicle checks. The 
responses for hackneys and PHCs are given in figures 4 and 5 
respectively. 
Non-met 
Per cent 
43.0 
39.2 
57.0 
43.0 
28.3 
244 
Met 
Per cent 
69.5 
19.2 
57.7 
30.1 
42.3 
2 6 
It can be seen that in well over half the cases both random and 
regular checks are employed by councils to monitor the -road 
worthiness of vehicles providing each kind of service. Table 20 
disaggregates the results by policy type and district status. 
Vehicle checks are carried out much more frequently in the 
regulated/metropolitan districts. 
FIGURE 4. ROAO-WORTHINESS CHECKS 
FOR H A C K N R T  
FREOUENCY OF CABCHECK 
BOTH 
158  
FlGURE 5. ROAD-WORMINESS CHECKS 
FOR PHCS 
FPEOUENCY Of PHCCHECK RANDOM 82 
RANDOM 
72 
Data set B. 
Table 20. Road worthiness checks for hackneys by licensing policy 
and district status. 
Regulating authorities are found to employ tighter policy with 
regard to vehicle checks with only 0.7% of such councils having 
no monitoring policy. This compares to 6.35 and 8.3% for those 
where entry contols were removed (or where never in place) before 
and after 1986 respectively. 
The number of officers employed by districts whose brief 
includes vehicle standards enforcement is as follows:- 
Table 21 The number of part time enforcement officers by 
district type. 
Data set D 
OFFICERS 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
9 
Total 
On average, 1.4 officers are employed. Metropolitan councils 
employ 2.6 officers whose duties include taxi quality enforcement 
on at least a part time basis, this compares with an average of 
1.3 for non-metropolitan councils. 
ALL 
Freq 
20 
169 
46 
15 
6 
3 
0 
2 
1 
262 
% 
7.6 
64.5 
17.6 
5.7 
2.3 
1.1 
- 
0.8 
0.4 
100.0 
METROPOLITAN 
Freq 
1 
7 
8 
4 
1 
0 
0 
2 
1 
24 
NON METROPOLITAN 
% 
4.2 
29.2 
33.3 
16.7 
4.2 
- 
- 
8.3 
4.2 
100.0 
Freq 
19 
162 
38 
11 
5 
3 
0 
0 
0 
238 
% 
8.0 
68.1 
16.0 
4.6 
2.1 
1.3 
- 
- 
- 
100.0 
Table 22 The number of part time enforcement officers by entry 
policy 
Data set D 
Regulated districts employ 1.53 officers, on average, compared 
to 1.28 for those who were derestricted before 1986 and 1.42 for 
those who derestricted after 1986. 
OFFICERS 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
9 
Total 
The distribution ofthe number of full time enforcement officers 
is as follows:- 
Table 23 The number of full time enforcement officers by 
district type. 
Dereg -86 Dereg 86- 
Data set D 
Regulated 
Freq 
3 
30 
6 
3 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
43 
Freq 
3 
18 
8 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
31 
Here the difference between metropolitan and non metropolitan 
councils is more stark with, on average 1.1 full time officers 
being employed by the former and 0.3 officers employed by the 
latter. 
Freq 
7 
93 
27 
11 
3 
3 
0 
1 
1 
146 
% 
7.0 
69.8 
14.0 
7.0 
2.3 
- 
- 
- 
- 
100.0 
% 
9.7 
58.1 
25.8 
3.2 
- 
- 
3.2 
- 
100.0 
% 
4.8 
63.7 
18.5 
7.5 
2.1 
2.1 
- 
0.7 
0.7 
100.0 
Table 24. The number of full time enforcement officers by entry 
policy. 
Data set D 
For those councils deregulated before 1986 there are 0.39 full 
time enforcement officers; for those who are currently regulated 
there are 0.45, and for those where restrictions have been 
removed since the 1985 Act, there are 0.47 full time enforcement 
officers. A dichotomy therefore exists between the situation in 
those districts where entry controls existed until 1986 and the 
rest with those having traditionally restricted entry more full 
time manpower to enforcement. 
7. PEAK DEMAND CHARACTERISTICS 
Experience gained from undertaking taxi service quality studies 
for a number of authorities has allowed us to identify certain 
key aspects of taxi markets with the existence of delays at 
certain times of the day and week, especially when we look at the 
rank trade. Variables which tend to be important include the 
number and capacity of night clubs in a district and the 
availability of other public transport modes at peak times, 
especially those associated with the late night pub and club 
trade. 
Information about the number of night clubs and night club 
capacities is summarised in the following table. 
Table 25. Night clubs and night club capacity. 
Data set D * Clubs per head of population expressed as a per 
cent. + Club capacity as per cent of population. 
Clubs 
Capacity 
Clubs/pop* 
CaP/PoP+ 
A1 l 
5.8 
2032.0 
0.005% 
1.7% 
Dereg -86 
4.4 
1028.0 
0.004% 
1.5% 
Dereg 86- 
8.0 
2528.0 
0.007% 
1.8% 
Regd 
6.9 
2453.0 
0.005% 
1.71% 
Sample 
223 
136 
148 
133 
Night club capacity is seen to be very much lower in-those 
districts where entry regulation has not traditionally been 
imposed. Interestingly, in those districts where entry barriers 
have been removed as a result of the 1985 Act there exist the 
largestnumber of night clubs and the greatest nightclub capacity 
both absolutely and in proportion to district population. 
Officers were asked about the extent to which late night bus 
services were available in their districts. The responses were 
as follows:- 
Table 26. The provision of late night bus services. 
*Per cent of metropolitan districts 
+Per cent of non metropolitan districts. Data set B 
Level of bus services 
No buses after 2200 
W'end services after 2200 
Services after 2200 all week 
Total 
Special club services 
Metropolitan districts 
Non metropolitan districts 
- 
Bus services aimed specifically at the late night weekend club 
trade were available in about 1 in 8 districts, however, in 
nearly half, no late night bus services are available. The 
following table shows the availability of late night bus services 
by entry policy. 
Table 27. The provision of late night bus services by entry 
policy. 
Frequency 
122 
16 
109 
247 
3 1 
8 
23 
None after 2200 
Percent 
49.4 
6.5 
44.1 
100.0 
12.6 
32. O* 
10.5+ 
Data set B 
The table above shows that those districts who have deregulated 
since 1986 have the lowest provision of late night bus services. 
Further, in those districts where entry regulation is still in 
.- 
- 
20 
place we see the highest provision of late night bus services. 
8. RANK DESIGNATION POLICY 
In this section we examine the provision and utilisation of rank 
space, the constraints on the extension of rank space and 
attitudes of authorities to the problem of rank overspill where 
this exists. 
The number and capacity of ranks are given in table 28. 
Table 28. The number of 24 hour ranks. 
Data set B 
The distribution of the number of part time ranks is as follows:- 
Table 29. The number of part time ranks. 
24 hour ranks 
0 
1-2 
3-4 
5-6 
7-8 
9-10 
11-20 
21-30 
31-40 
41-50 
71-80 
Total 
Data set B 
Frequency 
8 
6 0 
57 
4 2 
2 5 
10 
2 9 
6 
5 
1 
1 
244 
Part time 
ranks 
0 
1-2 
3 -4 
5-6 
7-8 
9-10 
11-20 
21-30 
Total 
Officers were asked to disclose the number of designated ranks 
in their district which were not currently utilised by the trade 
for the purpose of plying for hire. The following table 
- - 
2 1 
Per cent 
3.3 
24.6 
23.4 
17.2 
10.2 
4.1 
11.9 
2.5 
2.0 
0.4 
0.4 
100.0 
Frequency 
14 3 
43 
2 0 
8 
7 
6 
5 
1 
233 
Cum % 
3.3 
27.9 
51.2 
68.4 
78.7 
82.8 
94.7 
97.1 
99.2 
99.6 
100.0 
100.0 
Per cent 
61.4 
18.5 
8.6 
3.4 
3.0 
2.6 
2.1 
0.4 
100.0 
Cum % 
61.4 
79.9 
88.4 
91.2 
94.8 
97.4 
99.6 
100.0 
100.0 
summarises the results. It can be seen that in the almost 'two 
thirds of districts had at least one designiated rank that was 
not used. 
Table 30. The number of under utilised ranks. 
Data set B 
The following table presents average values for rank sizes. On 
average, ranks designated for 24 hour use are larger in those 
districts who have deregulated since the 1986, these also exhibit 
the smallest allocation of part time rank spaces. regarding the 
number of ranks, we see that provision in regulated and recently 
deregulated districts in of the order of double that in the 
districts who either never had entry restrictions or removedthem 
before 1986. 
Unused 
ranks 
0 
1-2 
3-4 
5-6 
7-8 
9-10 
11-20 
21-30 
Total 
Table 31. Mean ranks and rank capacities. 
Per cent 
38.2 
33.8 
16.2 
4.4 
1.5 
3.4 
2.0 
0.5 
100.0 
Frequency 
7 8 
69 
33 
9 
3 
7 
4 
1 
204 
Cum % 
38.2 
72.0 
88.2 
92.6 
94.1 
97.5 
99.5 
100.0 
100.0 
Data set B 
Statistic 
Mean space/FT rank 
Mean space/PT rank 
Mean combined ranks 
We now turn to a consideration of the amount of rank space per 
licensed hackney. The followingtable gives average values. Thus, 
overall there are 0.42 24 hour rank spaces allocated per hackney 
and 0.52 total spaces. Provision is highest in regulated and 
metropolitan districts and lowest in those districts where entry 
controls have been removed since 1986. This points to the problem 
of increasing rank capacity in line with increased fleet size, 
an issue examined in more detail in the next section. 
All 
5.2 
4.2 
8.1 
Dereg -86 
4.2 
5.7 
4.3 
Dereg 86- 
6.0 
3.0 
8.4 
Regd 
5.6 
4.2 
9.8 
Table 32. Rank space per hackney by licensing policy and district 
status. 
Data set B 
8.1 Adeauacv of ranks and constraints on rank desianation 
24 hr ranks 
All ranks 
officers were asked about the incidence of rank overspill and 
the action (if any) used against offending drivers. The responses 
were as follows:- 
Dereg 86- 
0.24 
0.28 
Dereg -86 
0.33 
0.40 
It can be seen that the problem of insufficient rank space during 
peak demand periods is widespread with over three quarters of 
officers having experienced it at some stage and nearly one in 
four stating that it occurred on a regular basis. We also observe 
the higher incidence of rank overspill in those districts who 
have deregulated since 1986 and the regular nature of these 
occurrences. 
In the vast majority of cases, no action was taken against 
offenders by the authority itself, the enforcement of disciplin 
considered to be the responsibility of traffic wardens and/orthe 
police. In only about 9% of cases (mostly metropolitan in nature) 
were steps taken to prosecute persistent offenders, with a much 
smaller number resorting to revoking licences or simply moving 
drivers on. 
Regd 
0.53 
0.61 
Table 33. The occurrence of rank overspill. 
Data set D 
Met 
0.53 
0.71 
Non met 
0.41 
0.50 
Total 
0.43 
0.52 
The main constraints on the provision of more rank space was 
distributed as follows:- 
Table 34. Constraints on increasing rank capacity. 
Data set D 
Constraint 
Congestion 
Pedestrianisation 
Parking policy 
Trade opposed 
Public opposed 
Other 
Total 
As might be expected the most commonly cited constraints 
personify the premium attached to centrally located roadspace. 
Of the lpothertl responses, l0 authorities stated that there was 
no demand for additional rank space. "No suitable sites1! and 
"County Council agreementf1 were each cited as constraints by 6 
respondents, tlRedevelopment work" by 3, "private ownership of 
landu by 2 and Iflack of resourcesw by one. 
9. STRUCTURE OF THE HACKNEY TRADE. 
Frequency 
123 
21 
2 7 
5 
3 
3 4 
213 
Officers were asked to estimate the a split of work in each 
principal town of workbetween rank, phone, flagdown and contract 
work. The split, averaged across all districts, is estimated as 
follows. The estimates are for up to four principal towns in a 
district in descending order of importance. Thus, for the main 
town we find that, on average, rank business is estimated to 
account for just over 40% of total business with phone trips 
second. Flagdowns are estimated to account for only 1 in 14 
trips. As we move from main town to secondary towns we see that 
rank and flagdown trips fall and phone and contract work 
increases. 
Per cent 
57.7 
9.9 
12.7 
2.3 
1.4 
16.0 
100.0 
Table 35. Composition of hackney trade. 
Data set D 
Rank 
Phone 
Flagdown 
Contract 
Sample 
Town 1 
43.4 
37.2 
7.3 
12.3 
168 
Town 2 
25.7 
57.0 
5.5 
11.8 
96 
Town 3 
22.8 
57.6 
4.6 
15.0 
56 
Town 4 
17.2 
63.2 
4.6 
15.0 
3 2 
The per cent of trade estimated for town 1 by licensing pblicy 
and district status is as follows:- 
Table 36.  Composition of hackney trade by licensing policy and 
district status. 
Data set D 
Regulated districts are considered to be slightly more rank based 
than the others. 
Officers were asked to estimate the proportion of the hackney 
trade accounted for by owner drivers and whether a trend towards 
or away from owner drivers could be identified. The responses 
are illustrated in figure 6 .  
Met 
4 9 . 4  
2 2 . 7  
1 2 . 7  
2 2 . 1  
15  
Rank 
Phone 
Flagdown 
Contract 
Sample 
FIGURE 6. PROPORTION OF DRWERS WHO 
OWN THEIR VEHICLE 
Non Met 
4 2 . 4  
3 8 . 1  
6 . 5  
1 1 . 2  
153 
- 
Dereg 86- 
4 4 . 0  
4 0 . 2  
3 . 6  
1 2 . 2  
2  9  
Dereg -86 
4 4 . 8  
38 .6  
6 . 3  
8 . 5  
18 
FREQUENCY 
Regd 
47 .8  
30 .5  
7 . 8  
12 .2  
101  
0 10 20 30  40 50 60 7 0  80 90 100 
OWNER MIDPOINT 
PERCENT OWNER-DRIVERS 
25 
The mean estimate of ownership of vehicles by drivers was 65.3%. 
Mean owner drivership by licensing policy is as follows:- 
Table 37. Mean proportion of owner drivers by licensing policy 
and district status. 
Data set B 
Mean 
ownership 
Sample size 
Driver-ownership is highest in the metropolitan districts and 
lowest in those where entry restrictions have been removed since 
1986. The distribution of ownership by hackney licensing policy 
is illustrated in figure 7. 
f lGURE 7. PROPORTION OF DRIVERS WHO 
OWN THEIR VEHICLE BY POUCY TYPE 
Dereg -86 
68.3 
3  1 
OWNER MIDPOINT 
POLICY m 1 m 2 m 3 
Dereg 86- 
58.7 
4  8 
PER CENT 0 WNER-DRIVERS 
I=DERECUUTED POST 1986 
Z=DEREGULATED PRE 1986. S=REGUMTED 
Regd 
66.9 
1 4 0  
Met 
73.2 
2 5 
Non met 
64 .4  
236  
- .  
Officers were asked if they considered a trend either towards or 
away from owner drivers to exist in their district: the responses 
are as follows:- 
Table 38. Trends in the proportion of owner drivers. 
Data set B 
Just over half the officers responding considered that a trend 
towards owner-drivers was evident in their distrct and only about 
12% thought that a trend in the opposite direction existed. 
District type appears to have no effect on officersn assessment. 
The following table gives the same results split by entry policy. 
We see some evidence to suggest a higher degree of concentration 
of driver-ownership in those districts were free entry has 
existed prior to 1986 than in those where free entry is absent 
or a recent innovation. 
Table 39. Trend in driver-ownership by licensing policy. 
Data set B 
10. SECTION 16 COURT CASES 
The provisions of the 1985 Transport Act, and in particular, the 
implications of section 16 of that Act are doubtless familiar to 
reader and will not be repeated here. Of those councils 
responding to the survey, 25 had had their licensing policy 
challenged under Section 16 (or were currently in the course of 
procedings). Of the 27 cases cited the councilns policy was 
- - 
2 7 
upheld in 13, rejected in 11, and was either not defined or 
pending in 3. In an additional 3 cases the Trade had taken out 
an injunction to prevent the issue of extra licences but in each 
case the council had successfully appealed and the injunction had 
been removed. 
11. SUMMARY 
This paper has presented the results of a follow up study to 
that carried out in 1988 by ITS (Toner 1989) . The purpose of the 
present study is to up date some key findings of that study, and 
to examine a number of additional questions as part of the 
ongoing programme of research into the workings of local taxi 
markets being undertaken at the Institute. 
11.1 Hacknev licensina ~olicv. 
Very little change, on aggregate, has occurred re the stance of 
councils on entry control. However, of the 133 responding 
councils which retain quantity control the majority, ( 5 4 % ) ,  had 
issued at least one plate in the period between the springs of 
1988 and 1989. Thus, although quantity control remains 
widespread, absolute restriction of hackney numbers is apparent 
in less than 30% of responding councils. The extent of licence 
issuance in districts where quantity controls are retained is 
relatively low however, with average issuance for those who have 
issued being half that of all deregulated districts and less than 
a third of that of those who have deregulated since the 
implementation ofthe 1985 Transport Act (though when figures are 
adjusted for outliers the proportion is much increased). 
Where quantity controls remain premium values are estimated to 
have risen, on average, in real terms by about £1,200 providing 
a clear indication that for the taxi market as a whole, many 
drivers who have traditionally enjoyed a privaleged market 
position are continuing to do so despite the Act. 
11.2 Fares ~olicv. 
The evidence on fares is mixed. On the one hand it appears that 
there exists the potential for the trade push up fares in 
recently deregulated markets. For instance, these authorities 
review fares more often than those where entry has not 
traditionally been restricted, and are more likely to include 
the trade in the fares review process. On the other hand, there 
is some evidence to suggest that, over a period of a year, users 
in districts where entry controls were in place were more likely 
to have experienced a fares increase than those in deregulated 
districts. 
11.3 Private hire cars. 
Overall, the hire car market has been expanding in the twelve 
month period of interest. However, growth has not been uniform. 
In particular, where quantity control for hackneys exists the 
increase in the number of hire cars over the period in question 
has far outstripped that in the deregulated districts. 
11.3 Qualitv enforcement ~olicv. 
The level of enforcement of vehicle standards for hackneys and 
hire cars was found to be similar. For both hackneys and hire 
cars the most regulated aspect of quality was the internal 
dimensions of the vehicle. This was followed by vehicle age and 
type. Enforcement policy does not appear to be strongly related 
to hackney licensing policy; however, larger differences were 
observed betweenmetropolitan and non-metropolitan districts with 
vehicle type and livery being more tightly controlled in the 
former and vehicle age being more tightly controlled in the 
latter. 
Road-worthiness checks on vehicles of some formwere carried out 
by the vast majority of districts, both random and regular checks 
were made by about 6 out of 10. There is some evidence to suggest 
that vehicle road worthiness standards are enforced most tightly 
in districts where entry is restricted. 
On average, districts employ 1.4 officers whose duties include 
enforcement duties either on at least a part time basis and 
0.42 full time officers. Using the amount of manpower as a guide, 
there appears to be a greater emphasis on enforcement in the 
metropolitan districts compared to the others and in those where 
entry controls either currently exist or existed until 1986. 
11.4 Peak demand characteristics. 
The two variables analysed under this heading were the number 
and capacity of night clubs and the availability of bus services 
late at night. Those councils who had deregulated as a result of 
the introduction of the 1985 Transport Act were found to exhibit 
slightly higher club and club capacity to population ratios than 
those where entry controls are still in position, and rather 
higher ratios than those who were deregulated before 1986. 
Further, those deregulating since 1986 have the lowest level of 
late night bus provision. 
11.5 Rank desisnation ~olicv. 
Rank space provided per licenced hackney was found to be 0.43 
on average. However, for those districts where entry restriction 
have been removed since 1986 provision is only 0.28 spaces per 
licensed hackney reflecting the difficulties experienced by the 
regulating authorities in increasing centrally located rank space 
in line with increases in supply. It is not therefore suprising 
to find that the occurrence of rank overspill is highest in these 
same districts with 89% of officers citing that it occurred and 
70% indicating that it occurred regularly. The major constraint 
on the provision of extra rank space is the conflict with the 
attempt to combat congestion. 
11.6 Structure of the hacknev trade. 
For principal towns the largest slice of trade is estimated to 
be rank based trips, accounting for 43%. The telephone trade is 
estimated to account for 37% with contract work on 12% and 
flagdowns on 7%. For the minor towns in districts the 
distribution of work is very much changed however, with telephone 
work being estimated to account for nearly two thirds of trade 
and rank trips only representing 1 in 6. Taking the principal 
town alone we find that rank trips are estimated to be slightly 
more important in the regulated/metropolitan districts. Contract 
work is also apparently dependent upon district type being 
estimated to account for 22% of total trade in the metropolitan 
districts, very nearly as important as the telephone trade. 
11.7 Section 16 cases. 
Case information was supplied by 25 councils with the outcomes 
of actions overall being fairly evenly balanced. 
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